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On Peterson’s Truth 
Above all, the search after truth and its eager pursuit are peculiar to man. 
– Cicero "On Duties" 1913, 15 
Jordan Peterson’s remarks on the nature of truth are voluminous. He devotes whole lectures and book-
chapters to its analysis. Despite this, widespread confusion persists on the details of Peterson’s distinctive 
understanding of truth. One reason for this that Peterson’s treatment of truth is scattered and unsystematic. 
Another reason is that the scholarly work on Peterson’s truth is lacking. It is the goal of this paper to 
clarify Peterson’s views by deploying powerful instruments of analysis from contemporary philosophical 
literature. Based on the provided clarification, Peterson’s truth proves nowhere near as ludicrous as critics 
make it seem, for it accommodates a long and healthy tradition of theorizing labeled anti-realism. The 
core thesis of this approach is that truth is an inherently mind-dependent notion, so that nothing in the 
world is true or false without cognitive agents. Peterson deploys this general standpoint and develops it 
further to include distinctively human-bound commitments, such as the Nietzschean paradigm, according 
to which truth exists to serve life, and the Darwinian-pragmatist approach, according to which truth is 
that which is useful to believe and thus aids survival across time. 
Much of Peterson’s thinking relies on his understanding of truth. From his works, we find frequent 
remarks on the importance of speaking the truth, and numerous statements on the value of truth as a 
perquisite for human flourishing. Take the 8th chapter of Peterson’s bestseller “12 Rules for Life” labeled 
“Tell the truth—or, at least, don’t lie” where he writes: 
To tell the truth is to bring the most habitable reality into Being. Truth builds edifices that can 
stand a thousand years. Truth feeds and clothes the poor, and makes nations wealthy and safe. 
Truth reduces the terrible complexity of a man to the simplicity of his word, so that he can 
become a partner, rather than an enemy. Truth makes the past truly past, and makes the best 
use of the future’s possibilities. Truth is the ultimate, inexhaustible natural resource. It’s the 
light in the darkness. See the truth. Tell the truth. (2018, 230) 
While repeatedly emphasizing the immense value that truth bears for our lives, more often than not, 
Peterson assumes a notion of truth rather than offering an explicit definition. This is understandable. The 
abstract and exceedingly complex nature of truth makes it a challenging subject of analysis. Philosophers 
have theorized about its nature from the pre-Socratics to the present-day with no consensus in sight. Far 
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from it, for views about the nature of truth show notorious variety in the history of western thought, 
amounting to mutually exclusive definitions of various kinds. Some see truth as a fully objective matter, 
representing things ‘as they are’ independent of minds, and others equate it with what science has at any 
given time proven to be the case. Further complicating matters, definitions of truth are notoriously 
enmeshed with paradoxes. Perhaps the most well-known example is the liar’s paradox, demonstrated by 
the famous Cretan two and a half millennia ago, who claimed that all Cretans are liars, thereby causing 
confusion on whether he himself was telling the truth. Complicating matters more, the inevitable 
challenges with defining truth are in plain contrast with the foundational role it has for our lives. True 
beliefs enable navigation in the world, and they ground our beliefs to that which is real, in contrast to 
mere illusion or wishful thinking. Finally, the fundamentality of truth is indicated by its intuitiveness and 
at least seeming clarity. Children learn the meaning of the word ‘true’ at an early age, and we do not 
think that there is any confusion involved with the term, for example, when obliging people to tell the 
truth and nothing but the truth in our courtrooms. 
It is because of such inevitable challenges with defining truth that Peterson is wary of offering an explicit 
definition of it. This wariness should not be confused with a view about the defectiveness or redundancy 
of truth. As has become increasingly clear in the political atmosphere of recent years, real threat lies in 
the decay of appreciation towards truth. When presidents of global superpowers make materially false 
claims, and when bald-faced lies and deception is tolerated from our leaders, the Petersonian thesis that 
we should speak the truth, or at least not lie, is plainly contradicted on a grandiose scale. But Peterson is 
no stranger to defending truth from those who seek to corrode it, for his status as a public intellectual 
was largely sparked by his opposition of relativism about truth associated with post-modernist thinking. 
Of course, the threat that Peterson diagnosed with relativism is serious and real, well in line with the 
interpretation of Hannah Arendt, who diagnosed similar issues with the decay of truth in relation to 
totalitarian regimes: 
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but 
people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the 
distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist. (1951, 474) 
Without a robust notion of truth, societies become exposed to the control of Tyrants, who are first to 
criticize the notion, bearing the wish that it can be fabricated or molded to aid their means. As the old 
tale goes, describing virtue as a shield and truth as a sword, the people in power understand that when 
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resistance is expected, the crowds better be disarmed. It is this task, of exploring, recovering, and 
defending a robust notion of truth that Peterson commits to both explicitly and implicitly in substantive 
sections of his work, and it is the task of the remainder of this paper to clarify his project. 
The Nature Question 
Philosophers and laymen alike have been interested in the nature of truth throughout the history of 
Western thought. This tendency was adequately summarized by Cicero in antiquity, according to whom 
humans are by nature truth-oriented beings. But past general interest, not much has been agreed upon 
regarding truths nature. One central disagreement that cuts across the history of Western philosophy is 
whether truth is dependent or independent of human concerns, such as our knowledge about it. One 
manifestation of this disagreement is the old dilemma that asks whether sound is made by a tree falling 
in a forest when no one is around? More sophisticated iteration of the same problem asks whether there 
is a truth concerning the even or uneven number of planets in the universe, even if there is in principle 
no way for us to know about it. While we are inclined to answer that yes, truth exists about this matter, 
questions about truth seem to emerge only in the context of minds, and speaking about truth past what 
can be known seems redundant and unworthwhile. The frustration involved with these types of questions 
is evident in the age-old debate about the existence of God. Whether or not he does indeed exist, there 
seems to be no way for us to know about it from our limited human perspective, so concluding 
judgements are better left unmade. It is a matter of faith, and not of knowledge, what position we choose 
to deploy. In this sense, there seems to be little use for a transcendent, fully objective notion of truth that 
stands disconnected from our ability to know about it. 
Interestingly enough, much of the confusion and critique regarding Peterson’s truth directly relates to the 
question of whether truth is a mind-dependent or -independent notion. It is precisely here that Peterson’s 
famous debate with Sam Harris got stuck on the topic of truth. Conflict emerged when Harris diagnosed 
a disagreement between him and Peterson, refusing to continue discussion before a mutual understanding 
about the nature of truth was achieved. But keeping in mind the unavoidable challenges with defining 
truth and it’s widely disagreed upon nature, this strategy rests on a superfluous requirement. Surely, we 
need not agree on details about truths nature before discussion becomes meaningful. But the worry that 
Harris bears is not completely meritless. As noted, the possession of a robust notion of truth is a 
precondition for serious-minded discussion and debate. To illustrate, take the specific phenomena of 
disagreement that is oftentimes the motivating force behind our debates. When disagreeing on an 
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important topic, such as climate change or the utility of vaccinations, we do not view these disagreements 
as satisfactory conclusions. Rather, we make considerable efforts to resolve them by figuring out the 
truth. The worry is that if we operate with incompatible notions of truth, discussion itself becomes 
meaningless, for we are aiming at different goals. Thus, there must rest some agreement upon the nature 
of truth that facilitates the possibility of rational discourse in the first place. But I do not think that Harris 
and Peterson disagree on this point. Surely, they both agree that in one way or another truth describes 
things are they are, and that truth is that which is in general correct to believe. It is not obvious, however, 
why this basic intuition is not enough to facilitate meaningful discussion and debate. 
But what sparked the conflict between Harris and Peterson might have been a misdiagnosis in the first 
place. According to Harris, the central point of disagreement between him and Peterson is whether truth 
is objective. Objectivity here means that truth is a mind-independent matter, so that truth is independent 
of human-concerns, even our ability to know about it. For Harris, every belief that is subject to truth is 
necessarily true or false, independent of anyone’s beliefs about it, full stop. For Peterson, beliefs can be 
true or false, or true enough, depending on their ability to help achieve our goals. In this sense, the 
fundamentals of truth are those that guide action, and truth must be studied in relation to achieving 
success in our practices. Objectivity is of secondary interest. To illustrate this difference, take a map of 
the New York subway system. In an objective, mind-independent sense, this map fails to be a true 
representation, for it is a wholly inaccurate misrepresentation of its geometrical structure. It lacks 
dimension and is crudely simplifying. But in the non-objective, mind-dependent sense, the map is very 
much a true description, more so than an objective representation would be, for it enables us to navigate 
the system with great success. Of course, in other situations where you have motives other than 
navigation, the objective representation could serve your means better. But this is precisely the point that 
Peterson makes. Truth must be studied in relation to achieving success in our practices. Presumably, this 
is the context where the phenomena of truth emerged in the first place, as a pre-theoretical understanding 
of what we should believe to bring the best possible reality into being. 
Thus, one crucial point of disagreement between Harris and Peterson is that while the former commits 
strictly to the minimal intuition that truth’s nature is exhausted by its objectivity as demonstrated by the 
relatively recent theoretical definitions, the latter holds that this is not the case, for more is entailed in the 
notion, such as the moral constitution of being useful to believe. But what critics have failed to appreciate 
is that Peterson only objects to the negative claim that nothing else is involved with truth than objectivity. 
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Since Peterson has no qualms with the objective aspects of truth as such, closer analysis proves 
illuminating. 
Truths Human-bound or Unbound Nature 
As happens, the views of truth that Harris and Peterson commit to run in line with a broader and much 
older philosophical debate between realist and anti-realist approaches to truth. According to the former, 
truth is a fully objective matter, representing how things are independent of minds, and independent of 
any human concerns. For example, there is a truth about the even or uneven number of planets in the 
universe, independent of our ability to know about it, full stop. Harris persists that this minimal intuition 
captures the essence of truth. There are static truths about the world, known or unknown, and valuable 
or nonvaluable to believe. But if this were the case, why not just replace the concept of truth with 
objectivity? For Peterson, objectivity alone does not exhaust the nature of truth, falling short by 
downplaying the significance of its historical constitution and complexity and the significance it has for 
our lives. Following the Nietzschean paradigm, because truth is intimately tied to human-concerns as an 
instrument of serving life, beliefs can be not only true or false, but true enough in relation to their ability 
to help achieve our aspirations. Indeed, the law of bivalence, the idea that there are only two truth-values 
(true and false) is a hallmark commitment of realist theories, while widely rejected by the anti-realists. 
For the latter, beliefs can be not only true or false, but more or less true, true enough, or unknown. To 
illustrate this further, let’s assume that Smith has been systematically unfaithful to his wife. Both beliefs 
that Smith possibly cheated on his wife, and that he has systematically done so are equally true in the 
realist sense. But surely, when asked about the faithfulness of Smith, one of these truths is truer than the 
other. The realist might oppose that here we fail to make a distinction between truth and accuracy. Both 
beliefs are true, yet one is also accurate. But whether or not truth can be so disconnected from other 
concepts is debatable, as shown in the distinct views promoted by Harris and Peterson. 
While Harris presents his realist approach to truth as the standard view, Peterson is surely not alone in 
opposing it by committing to a form of anti-realism. As Donald Davidson, perhaps the most prominent 
theorist of truth of the latter part of the 20th century adequately summarizes: “Nothing in the world, no 
object or event, would be true or false if there were not thinking creatures.” (1990, 279). But this intuition 
about the mind-dependentness of truth is much older, already suggested by Aristotle, according to whom 
the existence of humans grounds the truth that humans exist but not the other way around. There are 
truths about things only insofar as there are humans, or thinking creatures, to uphold them. Peterson’s 
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approach is well in line with this general intuition. Whether and to what extent this applies to Harris is 
debatable, for as noted, he commits to the thesis that truth is fully independent of minds. For Peterson, 
we have a concept of truth now because it has proven useful to have before, and this ability to aid human 
aspirations ought to be taken as an essential feature of truth. 
Interestingly enough, one consequence of Peterson’s approach is that questions about the transcendent, 
mind-independent or fully objective nature of truth become not only of secondary interest, but somewhat 
questionable in the first place. Because humans are finite creatures with limited cognitive capabilities, 
there seems to be no way for us to step beyond the limits of our understanding to evaluate the full 
objectivity of our claims. But according to the realists, truth is independent of our knowledge bearing 
frameworks, resting outside of them as idealized object. How can we make such a claim immanently 
from the inherently limited human-perspective? One issue with these types of transcendental arguments 
is present in the never-ending debate about whether the will is truly free from causal influence. There 
seems to be no way for us to know, for knowing would imply stepping beyond the limits of our 
understanding. There is no such Archimedean viewpoint from which the full objectivity of our claims 
can be evaluated, from which we can determinately explain how thoughts emerge, or whether we possess 
a ‘correct’ understanding of truth past what is accessible to us in midst of our practices. 
It is more common, however, to understand objectivity in a looser sense as that which is indicative of 
truth, rather than a description of the ‘whole truth’. But if understood in this sense, then the criticism that 
Peterson’s view of truth fails to accommodate the basic objectivist intuition is misplaced, for there is a 
way to account for it just as well, if not better to the realist approaches that render truth an unreachable 
abstraction that is disconnected from our concrete practices. 
Truth as an Instrument to Serve life 
Some have argued that Peterson’s commitment to a Darwinian-pragmatist form of anti-realism runs in 
conflict with the basic intuition that truth is objective. One way to understand the Darwinian-pragmatist 
approach to truth is to see it as arising from the Nietzschean paradigm, according to which truth exists to 
serve life. By providing pragmatic utility and thus aiding survival across time, speaking and believing 
the truth amounts to the increase of human flourishing. Regarding truths nature, the key realizations is 
that both of these approaches are manifestations of anti-realism regarding the notion. Truth is an 
inherently mind-dependent notion, and its nature derives from the role it has for our practices. Some see 
this as a problematic conclusion, claiming that it contradicts the basic intuition that truth is objective and 
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independent of any human-concerns. Simply put, if truth is that which is useful to believe, it cannot be 
simultaneously independent of anyone’s beliefs about it. The subsequent worry is that if truth indeed is 
dependent of human concerns, this renders it relative. If truth depends on what is useful to believe, yet 
what at any given time is useful to whom depends on various factors, then truth becomes relative to the 
circumstance in which utility is being evaluated. Finally, there seem to be truths that are in no way 
valuable to believe, like the trillionth decimal of π, and falsehoods that provide immense practical utility, 
such as occasional ungrounded self-confidence. Thus, by committing to his distinctively human-centric 
form of anti-realism, Peterson subjects his notion of truth to pressing and well-grounded critique. 
But the criticism that Peterson’s understanding of truth runs in conflict with the basic objectivist intuition 
is misplaced, for he is free to argue that objectivity is simply one aspect of truth that humans have 
constructed, and which has proven useful to possess, especially for our scientific understanding of the 
world. Because Peterson does not commit to the negative thesis that nothing else than this or that is 
entailed in truth, he is free to include various aspects under his notion, some being objective and others 
non-objective. This is only intuitive, for surely sometimes truth depends on mind-independent states of 
affairs, and other times on our human ways of thinking about the world. There are truths about medium 
sized physical entities such as stones and chairs, and there are truths about ethics and law such as what 
is permitted or prohibited to do. In this sense, Peterson simply acknowledges the breadth that truth 
displays in our cognitive lives, so that there is no limit to the aspects it can manifest in the constraints of 
the Nietzschean paradigm of serving life. All aspects of truth, even the ones that predicate objectivity, 
arise from the general need for such concepts, the existence of which is justified by their ability to aid 
our aspirations. 
What has been described above is equally tenable conclusion to the disconnected view of truth as a 
transcendent, fully objective and mind-independent notion that some critics uphold. In their view, 
because of the near infinite progress of science, nothing we ever discover is true in the fully objective 
sense. Simply put, everyone is always more or less wrong when measured up against an idealized notion 
of the ‘whole truth’. But what use is there for such a disconnected concept? The human predicament is 
that we are limited creatures and as such, our cognitive capabilities can never match up with the full 
complexity of the world. Despite this, it is extremely useful for us to hold that some things are true, even 
if not eternally so. What science has proven to be the case now is true, for all we know, and we use these 
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truths as instruments for fueling further discussions, debate, and the subsequent progress that follows. 
Again, no higher tribunal of truth than success in our practices. 
Nesting Argument 
What has been described above is Peterson’s (2018, 144) fundamental nesting argument that critics have 
failed to appreciate, resulting in confusion and misinterpretations of his views. Because of truths 
historically constructed nature, the concept overall is much older and broader than simple objective truth, 
which is a fairly recent theoretical invention. This historical grounding should be respected when 
studying truths nature and it is here that the intimate link between truth and our practices is grounded in. 
For example, in Old English, the term ‘true’ means that a person or an object like an axe is trustworthy 
and adheres to standards. But the idea that there is a connection between truth and the good is much older, 
already discoverable from the works of Plato, who states in the Republic that:  
So that what gives truth to the things known [beliefs] and the power to know to the knower is 
the form of the good. And though it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of 
knowledge. Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the [form of the] good is other 
and more beautiful than they. In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly considered sunlike, 
but it is wrong to think that they are the sun [the form of the good], so here it is right to think of 
knowledge and truth as goodlike but wrong to think that either of them is the good—for the good 
is yet more prized. (508e). 
Thus, according to one prominent view, truth has inherent moral constitution as that which is good to 
believe, for its nature derives from the form of the good, which is the highest ideal, shared by all particular 
things that are in one way or another good. 
But of course, for the concept of truth to be useful in our time, the historical aspects alone, such as the 
idea of truth as that which is good to believe, do not suffice, for they are potentially blind to the problems 
that we face here and now. Because of this, we want a concept of truth that respects its origins, but which 
is also useful in solving the problems that manifest in our time. Indeed, from this project of in one hand 
preserving the virtues of the old concept, and in the other developing it so that it better serves us now, 
we get to a result where the objectivity of truth need not be discarded. Objectivity can simply be treated 
as one of the newer aspects of Truth unqualified that is especially useful for those paths of inquiry that 
direct themselves towards mind-independent facets of the world. Even the notions of full objectivity or 
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the whole truth can be accounted for by Peterson’s anti-realist approach by treating them as useful 
features or instruments of our scientific understanding of the world. The usefulness of these ideas is 
evident, for example, in situations when something we hold to be true turns out false. We do not say that 
our beliefs became false. Rather, we say that they were false all along, and that we were simply mistaken 
in relation to the truth. But to emphasize, the existence of this feature is grounded in our need for it, and 
the utility it provides for our understanding of the world. In no way need the notions of truth or objectivity 
be understood as something mind-independent or transcendent. Further, in no way should objectivity be 
treated as the primary aspect of truth. What should be prioritized is the moral constitution of truth as that 
which is correct, useful or good to believe. Indeed, the priority of the moral constitution is evident when 
realizing that we would not have the ideas of truth, objectivity or the whole truth in the first place, were 
it not for their usefulness and the utility they provide for aiding our aspirations. Thus, if we admit that 
truth is an inherently human-bound notion, there to serve our aspirations like all other concepts, then the 
objectivity of truth can be preserved without a threat of a disconnect. Objectivity too, as a useful ideal, 
exists to serve. 
But of course, Peterson’s conception of truth is not devoid of problems. Because of its immense breadth, 
giving a clear, exhaustive, and non-contradictory definition of truth in the Petersonian sense becomes 
virtually impossible. I think Peterson is well aware of this consequence. However, the issue here might 
be misdiagnosed, for it is not obvious that such a definition can be offered in the first place. Truth is both 
a fundamental and exceedingly broad concept, displaying inconsistencies and paradoxes throughout, so 
there is no guarantee it can ever be defined in a manner that is exhaustive and non-contradictory. Simply 
put, the assumption that all concepts can be so defined might be where the problem lies. Further, by 
committing to a form of pragmatism, Peterson positions to oppose this type of theory-first approach that 
could see the indefinability issues as a sign of truths defectiveness. Indeed, it is pragmatism that saves 
truth from claims of redundancy in the first place, for our current inability to achieve an exhaustive 
definition of truth is no argument for its abandonment. The immense utility that truth provides for both 
daily life and our more theoretical aspirations is of utmost importance, and whether or not the concept 
can be exhaustively defined is of secondary interest. Supposedly we operate with a concept of truth even 
before our ability to speak about it, let alone try defining it. All this is very much in line with a 
philosophical theory called primitivism, according to which truth is such a fundamental notion that no 
exhaustive definition of it can even be achieved. 
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Some additional remarks are in accord. One thing to note is that as seems to be the case, the conflict 
between Peterson and Harris is partially cause by them speaking past each other. Contrary to widespread 
interpretation, the problem point is not so much about whether truth is objective or not. Rather, the 
disagreement is more about which aspects of truth are fundamental and should be prioritized. The point 
of Harris and other realists is that the objectivity and throughout mind-independentness of truth must not 
be compromised. Peterson, on the other hand, emphasizes the broader importance of truth, even at the 
cost of downplaying the significance of its objectivity. But surely there are approaches to truth that lie in 
between the minimal objectivist view and the exceedingly broad approach inspired by the Nietzschean 
paradigm. For example, we could endorse a type of goldilocks principle where not too little nor too much 
is included in our understanding of truth. It might be that while Harris and other realists risk err by taking 
the too little side, constraining truth to the extent that it does not adequately cover all the ways in which 
it manifests in our lives, Peterson risks falling on the too much side, potentially confusing the truth with 
independent questions about what is useful, valuable, or accurate to believe. Nonetheless, an important 
lesson from all of this is that both Harris and Peterson clearly see the topic of truth as having great 
importance, to the extent that they are willing to commit considerable effort to resolving disagreements 
about its nature. As noted in the beginning of this paper, this attitude is much needed in our time, when 
truth is once more directed with widespread skepticism and critique in both academic and less formal 
debates.1 
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